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1.  Introduction 
In 1990, Yale University became the first U.S. school to invest in hedge funds. Over 
the past fifteen years, the university increased the target for the absolute return portfo-
lio from an astounding 15% in 1990 to 25%. At $11.0 billion in 2003, Yale is one of 
the largest university endowments.1 A further milestone was when the California Pub-
lic Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) decided to allocate $1 billion to hedge 
funds in 2000. This announcement by the CalPERS state plan, if not before, made 
hedge funds an accepted asset class among large institutional investors. CalPERS, the 
largest pension plan in the U.S. with $182.9 billion under management at the end of 
2004, provides retirement and health benefits to more than 1.4 million public employ-
ees, retirees and their families, and more than 2,500 employers. Today, they target an 
asset allocation to alternative investments of 7%.2 
While investments of European institutional investors lag behind the U.S. experience, 
many large corporate pension plans have a track record of alternative investments. The 
Euro 3.8 billion Nestlé Fonds de Pensions, one of the biggest pension plans in Swit-
zerland, started investing 1% in hedge funds in 1996. Meanwhile, the allocation has 
reached 18% of total assets.3 
CalPERS’ investments in hedge funds delivered a return of 8.9% in 2004. The pension 
fund also disclosed that they pay currently about $200 million a year to managers of 
415 alternative investment firms to manage a total of $13.5 billion. This amounts to a 
management fee of approximately 1.5% of assets, not including performance fees.4 
Yale’s investment in absolute return strategies over the past ten years yielded 12.2% 
per year, with essentially no correlation to U.S. stock and bond markets. How do these 
returns compare on a risk-adjusted basis? 
FUNG/ HSIEH (1999) point out that the main common characteristic of hedge funds is 
rather their unregulated status than the fact that these funds pursue any common strat-
egy. The lack of regulation also means that hedge funds are not required to submit 
semi-annual or annual reports to a supervisory institution like the U.S. Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC). This makes it even more difficult for the investor to col-
lect information on peer funds and compare their performance. 
 
                                                 
1  The Yale Endowment, 2003 Update: www.yale.edu; Facts About Yale. Harvard University, at $25.4 
billion, the largest U.S. university endowment has a 12% target for investments in absolute return stra-
tegies. See the Annual Financial Report of Harvard University, Fiscal Year 2003-2004: http://vpf-
web.harvard.edu. 
2  Asset Allocation: www.calpers.ca.gov; CalPERS Investments - CalPERS Assets. 
3  James Mawson, April 2004, “Nestlé Puts 18% in Hedge Funds”, Financial Times. 
4  Marsh William, December 8, 2004. “CalPERS Tells What It Paid High-Risk Investment Funds”, New 
York Times. 
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The goal of this chapter is twofold: First, we present an overview of the current re-
search on hedge fund performance. Second, we provide new evidence for the Euro-
pean hedge fund industry. The empirical analysis scrutinizes the return patterns in the 
past and alerts investors to the potential failures of conventional performance meas-
ures. Major difficulties in evaluating the performance of hedge funds are the myriad of 
strategies and the large changes of statistical measures over time. Moreover, many 
strategies can be seriously hit by big losses (or gains) in the benchmark. Take merger 
arbitrage as an example. MITCHELL/ PULVINO (2001) show that this strategy resem-
bles an uncovered short put on the market index, such that most of the times the strat-
egy is uncorrelated with the market but large negative market returns can result in 
huge losses to the investor. Unfortunately, estimating the probability of the occurrence 
of such a catastrophic return is extremely hard and the characteristics of each event, 
like the near bankruptcy of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, are 
unique. 
We start out our analysis with a discussion of the return and risk characteristics of 
European hedge funds. In particular, we analyze their return, volatility, and correlation 
pattern over time. Next, we investigate whether successful funds persistently outper-
form their peers. The chapter concludes with an outline of potential failures of com-
monly used performance measures.  
 
2.  Data Description 
The empirical part of this chapter is based on the Eurekahedge European Hedge Fund 
Database.5 All funds in this database either allocate at least 40% of their portfolio to 
Europe or have domicile in Europe. The database contains a total of 1,217 individual 
hedge funds (and CTAs) by the end of August 2004; 1,129 live funds and 88 dead 
funds (8%).6 Eurekahedge is continuously adding new funds and collecting informa-
tion on dead funds. 
For 816 hedge funds we observe at least two monthly returns between January 1994 
and August 2004. Figure 1 shows the number of funds for various lengths of the ob-
servation period. All our subsequent calculations restrict to the subsample of 352 
funds with more than 36 months of data. 
                                                 
5  For details see www.eurekahedge.com. Eurekahedge was founded in 2001 and started distributing the 
European Hedge Fund Database in July 2003. 
6  Agarwal/ Daniel/ Naik (2004) point out that the term “dead” funds is misleading in the hedge fund 
literature. They coined the term “missing-in-action” hedge funds. However, in the tradition of the mu-
tual fund literature the term “dead” is also used in the hedge fund literature. The 88 funds in our sam-
ple are “missing-in-action” in July and August 2004. 
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The exhibit shows the number of funds for which we observe more monthly returns than indicated on the 
horizontal axis. The sample period extends from January 1994 to August 2004. For our analysis, we 
exclude all funds with less than three years of data. 
Figure 1: Number of Observations per Fund 
 
Figure 2 reports the breakdown of the hedge funds by investment strategy. Eureka-
hedge distinguishes between ten strategies: Arbitrage, CTA/Managed Futures, Dis-
tressed Debt, Event Driven, Fixed Income, Long/Short Equities, Macro, Multi-
Strategies, Relative Value, and Others. Almost half of the funds (46%) are classified 
as Long/Short Equities. The large fraction attributed to this investment style is consis-
tent with other major hedge fund data providers. MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) report 33% 
Long/Short Equity Hedge for the TASS database at the end of 2003. Once the 24% 
funds of funds in their study are excluded this translates into 43%.7 
                                                 
7  33% / (100% - 24%) = 43%. 
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The pie chart illustrates the breakdown of the total of 1,217 hedge funds by investment strategy at the end 
of the sample period in August 2004. All funds in the database invest at least 40% in Europe or are domi-
ciled in Europe. 
Figure 2: Investment Strategies 
 
In addition to monthly returns, the Eurekahedge European Hedge Fund Database sup-
plies in depth fund profiles. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics across all 
investment categories. Hedge funds typically charge a management fee of 1-2% of 
assets. This can be best seen from the two quantiles that are reported in the table: the 
25% quantile is 1% and the 75% quantile 2%. When the fund realizes positive returns 
the investor pays an additional layer of fees in the form of performance fees. The in-
dustry standard for performance fees is 20% of the profits. For relatively few funds 
(16%) the performance fee becomes effective only once profits exceed a hurdle rate, 
which typically equals a short-term Treasury bill rate or LIBOR (occasionally LIBOR 
plus a spread). On the other hand, almost all funds (93%) in our sample provide high-
water marks, which means that performance fees are paid only to the extent that the 
fund exceeds the high-water mark. A fund with a high-water mark provision has to 
recover first from previous losses before it can charge again performance fees. In prac-
tice, this threshold value is reset on a quarterly or annual basis.8 Thirty-eight percent 
of the funds charge other fees like initial sales charges (front-load charges), custody 
fees, and similar fees for administrating the fund. The median of the minimum re-
                                                 
8  Goetzmann/ Ingersoll/ Ross (2003) discuss the effects of high-water marks in detail. 
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quired investment is at Euro 100,000.9 Just a relatively small percentage of hedge 
funds (10%) imposes a lockup period of three months to one year during which an 
investor initially cannot redeem her shares. The table provides a snapshot of the char-
acteristics at the end of the sample period, however, fee arrangements of hedge funds 
are rarely revised.10 
Fund size measured by assets under management varies considerably, with the largest 
hedge fund managing Euro 3.5 billion. The medium size in our database is $52 mil-
lion. The boom of the hedge fund industry is very recent and furthermore the attrition 
rate is high. Figure 1 already indicates that individual fund histories are typically 
short. Table 1 confirms that the average lifespan is about three years. Eighty-tree per-
cent, or 679 out of 816 funds, are open funds and the remaining 17% (137 funds) are 
closed funds. 
 
Characteristic Mean Median Min. 25% Quantile 
75% 
Quantile Max. 
Management Fee 1.5 1.5 0.0 1.0 2.0 6.0 
Performance Fee 19.8 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 50.0 
Minimum Investment 
(Euro) 
291,026 100,000 0 82,284 411,420 4,114,200 
Fund Size 
(in million Euro) 
145 52 1 19 63 3,513 
Age (Years) 3.5 2.8 0.2 1.6 4.7 20.7 
The table reports summary statistics of the fee structure and additional hedge fund characteristics. The 
statistics use the full sample of 816 funds in August 2004. Besides the mean and median, the distribution 
of each variable is described by the lower and upper quartile, plus the range (minimum and maximum). 
Table 1: Fee Structure and Fund Characteristics 
 
Summary Statistics 
Next, we analyze mean return, standard deviation, and higher moments of discrete, 
monthly hedge fund returns. A careful analysis of higher moments, like skewness and 
kurtosis, is crucial to understand the failures of conventional performance measures 
when applied to hedge funds. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the subsample 
of 352 hedge funds with a time series that is at least three years long. The returns are 
measured net of management and performance fees. The mean return across all funds 
                                                 
9  We convert numbers reported by funds with reference currency US$ into euros at the exchange rate of 
0.8226 Euro/US$ (end of August 2004). This explains the odd numbers for the quantiles and the ma-
ximum of Euro 4,114,200, that actually corresponds to US$5 million.  
10  Liang (2000) compares the changes in the fee structure between 1997 and 1998 and finds that about 
1% of the hedge funds change their fees within one year. 
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is 0.94% per month and the standard deviation 3.69%. This corresponds to 11.28% 
and 12.78% on an annualized basis. The mean falls in the range that MALKIEL/ SAHA 
(2004) report for dead funds (6.05%) and live funds (13.45%) for U.S. data from 1996 
to 2003. LIANG (2003) documents average monthly returns of 1.16% during the time 
period 1994 to 2001. 
The strategies Relative Value, Long/Short Equities, and to a lesser extent Multi-
Strategy and CTA/Managed Futures exhibit positive skewness. A positive skewness 
means that the observations are spread out more to the right and, hence, the mean of 
such a distribution is higher than the median. A skewness of zero indicates a symmet-
rical distribution. To the extent that a large number of funds in the Long/Short Equi-
ties category hedge their downside exposure to the stock market while maintaining the 
upside potential, such strategies would result in fewer large negative returns. Hence, 
the distribution becomes positively skewed. 
 
 
Investment Style Mean STD Skewness Kurtosis No. of Funds 
Average 
No. of Obs. 
Arbitrage 0.62 1.21 -0.31 5.82 18 73 
CTA/Managed Futures 1.12 4.87 0.28 3.78 57 74 
Distressed Debt 1.72 4.41 -0.65 10.55 10 73 
Event Driven 0.82 1.78 -0.37 6.61 10 51 
Fixed Income 0.96 2.58 -0.42 6.46 21 60 
Long/Short Equities 0.93 3.75 0.68 6.61 163 63 
Macro 0.81 3.49 -0.05 4.69 24 70 
Multi-Strategy 0.95 3.51 0.33 6.23 20 72 
Relative Value 0.91 3.85 0.91 7.08 11 72 
Others 0.65 4.14 0.16 4.82 18 61 
All Funds 0.94 3.69 0.35 5.98 352 66 
MSCI Europe (in Euro) 0.74 4.86 -0.55 3.28   
MSCI World (in Euro) 0.63 4.90 -0.53 2.87   
S&P 500 0.92 4.45 -0.57 3.33   
The table compares the average return characteristics of the ten hedge funds strategies and three bench-
marks from January 1994 to August 2004. Mean and standard deviation (STD) are reported as percent-
ages per month. The average number of observations in the last column describes the average length of 
the observation period for the funds within each style. The statistics are tabulated for the 352 funds with 
at least 36 returns. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Hedge Fund Returns 
 
A typical feature of hedge fund returns is a high kurtosis (leptokurtic) that exceeds the 
kurtosis of three for a normal distribution. BROOKS/ KAT (2002) document low skew-
ness and high kurtosis for many hedge fund indices. In fact, the average kurtosis is 
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higher within all ten strategies separately. Thus, the hedge fund returns in our sample 
have more returns centered around the mean and in the extremes. The concerns about 
the extreme left tail of the distribution, the catastrophic returns, are discussed in more 
detail below.  
The fact that hedge funds do not necessarily report to a regulatory institution, like the 
SEC in the U.S., makes it more difficult to collect accurate data and construct a repre-
sentative database. Our database does not cover dead funds systematically before 2003 
and suffers from a number of measurement biases. Hedge funds drop out of the data-
base for various reasons. The fund in question might cease to exist, either because it is 
liquidated or merges with another fund. A defunct fund may also be one that is de-
listed by the database provider or the fund stopped reporting voluntarily. A fund’s 
decision to stop reporting in turn can be motivated by different reasons. The fund 
might be very successful and does no longer need to attract new investors, may simply 
want to operate in privacy, or prefers not to report low returns. This is called the self-
selection bias. LIANG (2000) provides evidence that funds most likely disappear due to 
inferior performance and hence dissolve. He documents that returns decline signifi-
cantly before exit.11 MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) point out that for such funds the last re-
turns prior to liquidation are often not even reported. 
A total of 88 (8%) funds in the Eurekahedge database drop out before August 2004. 
The empirical literature has primarily scrutinized U.S. data. LIANG (2000) documents 
an attrition rate for the TASS database (8.3%) that is three times higher than the attri-
tion rate of the HFR database.12 BROWN/ GOETZMANN/ IBBOTSON (1999) report an 
attrition rate of 20% for commodity trading advisors (CTAs), which is consistent with 
the 19% in FUNG/ HSIEH (1997b), and 14% for offshore hedge funds. Out of the 604 
funds in 1996, less than 25% in the sample of MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) survive until 
2004. 
The survivorship bias measures the difference between the returns for the sample with 
no dead funds compared to the universe of live and dead funds. On the basis of the 
reasons discussed above, it is not a priori given whether the survivorship bias distorts 
hedge fund returns positively or negatively. However, the consensus in the current 
literature seems to be that returns from major data providers are overstating the real-
ized returns of the hedge fund industry by 2-4% per year due to the survivorship 
bias.13 FUNG/ HSIEH (1997b) estimate the bias to be 3.4% for CTAs and BROWN/ 
                                                 
11  See Figure 1 in Liang (2000).  
12  Liang (2000) compares the time periods 1994-1997 in HFR and 1994-1998 in TASS. 
13  Ackermann/ McEnally/ Ravenscraft (1999) argue that the two effects cancel each other out. Liang 
(2000) provides evidence that their low estimate of a survivorship bias of only 0.16%, which is below 
the finding for mutual funds (e.g. Malkiel, 1995; Brown/ Goetzmann/ Ibbotson/ Ross, 1992; Carhart/ 
Carpenter/ Lynch/ Musto, 2002), is driven by the low number of dead funds in the HFR database and 
the use of data before 1994. 
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GOETZMANN/ IBBOTSON (1999) 3% for offshore funds. LIANG (2000) estimates a 
survivorship bias of over 2% per year, FUNG/ HSIEH (2000b) report 3%, and 
MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) 3.7%. 
Besides the survivorship bias and the self-selection bias, available returns are affected 
by the instant history bias (PARK (1995); FUNG/ HSIEH (2000b)). The instant history 
bias occurs when, after a few months in existence, a fund decides to be included in a 
database and its history is backfilled. When a fund decides to report to a database then 
it has likely a successful recent history and, therefore, you would expect the bias to be 
positive. This is a common problem of all existing databases. FUNG/ HSIEH (2000b) 
estimate that annual returns are biased upward by 1.4%. This is in contrast to the more 
recent finding of MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) who estimate the backfilling bias as high as 
5%. These magnitudes underscore that in the case of hedge funds the instant history 
bias needs to be taken seriously. 
Given these biases, comparisons across different databases should be performed with 
care. Moreover, the results also depend crucially on the particular time period that is 
being studied. In particular, earlier publications did not include the Russian crisis and 
the debacle of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998. 
 
Non-Normality of Hedge Fund Returns 
Many traditional performance measures are based on the assumption that underlying 
returns are normally distributed and, hence, can be accurately characterized using 
mean and standard deviation alone. The high values of kurtosis in Table 2 suggest that 
this assumption is violated. In this subsection, we apply the Jarque-Bera statistic (JAR-
QUE/ BERA (1980)) to test whether we can reject the null hypothesis that monthly 
hedge fund returns are normally distributed. This test statistic draws on the skewness 
and kurtosis coefficients.14 The results reported in Table 3 show that, overall, the nor-
mal distribution can be rejected in 57.4% of the cases (202 out of 352) at the 5% sig-
nificance level and for 47.7% (168 out of 352) at the 1% significance level. The in-
vestment styles Event Driven, Relative Value, and Distressed Debt exhibit returns that 
are far from being normal. At the other end of the spectrum, the Jarque-Bera statistic 
rejects normality for one third of the hedge funds classified as CTA/Managed Futures. 
Under the assumption that the returns across different hedge funds were independent 
and a significance level of 5%, we would expect that the null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution would be rejected for approximately 5% of the funds. Our findings for 
European hedge funds are consistent with the evidence from the U.S. hedge fund in-
                                                 
14  The Jarque-Bera statistic is distributed Chi-square with two degrees of freedom: 
2
2 2( 3) ~
6 4
n KS χ −+   , where S measures skewness, K kurtosis, and n the sample size. 
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dustry. Using the TASS database, MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) report the highest Jarque-
Bera statistics for the arbitrage funds (Convertible Arbitrage and Fixed Income Arbi-
trage) and the lowest values for the strategy Managed Futures for which the authors 
cannot reject normality at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
1% Level 5% Level No. of Investment Style No. of Funds Fraction No. of Funds Fraction Funds 
Arbitrage 7 38.9% 10 55.6% 18 
CTA/Managed Futures 13 22.8% 19 33.3% 57 
Distressed Debt 6 60.0% 7 70.0% 10 
Event Driven 7 70.0% 8 80.0% 10 
Fixed Income 9 42.9% 12 57.1% 21 
Long/Short Equities 90 55.2% 105 64.4% 163 
Macro 10 41.7% 11 45.8% 24 
Multi-Strategy 11 55.0% 13 65.0% 20 
Relative Value 7 63.6% 8 72.7% 11 
Others 8 44.4% 9 50.0% 18 
Total 168 47.7% 202 57.4% 352 
The table summarizes the number and fraction of funds for which the Jarque-Bera normality test is re-
jected at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The Jarque-Bera statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that 
skewness and kurtosis take the values of a normal distribution (skewness = 0, kurtosis = 3) and is asymp-
totically Chi-square distributed with two degrees of freedom. 
Table 3: Jarque-Bera Test Results 
 
Value-at-Risk 
Independent of the exact distribution of returns, the investor will be particularly con-
cerned about the extreme end of the left tail that contains the catastrophic losses. One 
way to quantify potential losses is to report the lower quantiles. Value-at-risk (VaR) at 
the 95% confidence level measures the cutoff value in the left tail of the distribution 
below which 5% of the worst losses fall.15 In other words, the probability that the re-
turn will fall below this value is 5%. We calculate VaR from the historical distribution 
of returns. Thus, VaR can easily be computed by sorting the hedge fund returns and 
then picking the one value that corresponds to the, say, 5% quantile. Assuming we had 
100 observations the fifth lowest value would correspond to the 5% quantile. We re-
peat this exercise for every fund individually and provide the average VaR values 
within each investment style category in Table 4. 
                                                 
15  A classic reference for Value-at-Risk is the book by Jorion (2000). 
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The advantage of this non-parametric VaR approach is that we do not need to make 
any assumptions about the distribution of returns, which is convenient given that hed-
ge fund returns often exhibit distributions that are far different from a normal distribu-
tion or any other familiar distribution. The main drawback of the method is its reliance 
on a short data window. To mitigate this issue we consider only funds with at least 
five years of data for this part of our analysis. However, LO (2002) demonstrates that 
one needs a much longer time series to allow any powerful inference. 
Furthermore, the plain-vanilla VaR measure does only take into account the frequency 
of catastrophic events in the far left tail of the distribution but neglects their size. The 
expected shortfall reported in the last column of Table 4 attempts to incorporate this 
information and measures the expected value of the worst losses. To ensure that we 
have a reasonable number of observations in the left tail we report the expected short-
fall for the 5% quantile only. In practice, the expected shortfall has become a wide-
spread risk management tool. AGARWAL/ NAIK (2004) discuss the benefits of this 
measure in detail.16 It is apparent that due to outliers the expected shortfall is, at times, 
much closer to the VaR(99%) than VaR(95%); the funds in the style category Macro 
are an example. 
 
Investment Style VaR(95%) VaR(99%) Expected Shortfall 
Arbitrage -1.41 -3.19 -2.61 
CTA/Managed Futures -6.21 -10.44 -8.75 
Distressed Debt -4.64 -16.34 -10.69 
Event Driven -1.40 -3.19 -2.52 
Fixed Income -3.51 -12.11 -7.94 
Long/Short Equities -5.68 -11.24 -9.13 
Macro -5.54 -9.40 -9.04 
Multi-Strategy -4.66 -9.35 -7.29 
Relative Value -5.49 -13.65 -10.40 
Others -8.24 -15.80 -11.92 
MSCI Europe (Euro) -8.62 -13.27 -10.87 
MSCI World (Euro) -8.29 -11.66 -10.69 
S&P 500 -7.12 -10.87 -9.70 
For each of the 173 funds with at least five years of data Value-at-Risk (VaR) is computed from the his-
torical distribution of monthly returns. The table shows the average VaR with a 95% and 99% confidence 
interval by investment style. The expected shortfall measures the expected value of the losses in the 5% 
quantile. All numbers are expressed as percentages per month. 
Table 4: Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall 
                                                 
16  Other names for this measure are tail conditional expectation, conditional loss, or tail loss. 
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3.  Performance Persistence 
In this section we study the performance pattern for the overall hedge fund industry 
and, at the fund level, whether past winners continue to outperform their peers. At 
first, we analyze the changes in volatility and correlation with the market index. The 
results provide insights on how major events interact with hedge fund performance. A 
further complication are the discrepancies that result from calculating these measures 
based on monthly or quarterly data. 
 
 
The graph plots three major indices over the time period January 1994 to August 2004: the MSCI Europe, 
MSCI World, and S&P 500. The scale on the left applies to the two MSCI indices whereas the right scale 
shows the index value for the S&P 500. All indices are adjusted for dividends and splits. 
Figure 3: Evolution of Stock Market Indices 
 
Before inspecting the robustness of basic measures, it is worthwhile to review the 
recent history of international stock markets. Figure 3 displays three major indices 
during our sample period from January 1994 to August 2004. This time period is 
marked by a number of major events: The Mexican Peso crisis (December 1994 – 
March 1995), the Asian financial crisis (May – December 1997) that culminated in the 
devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, the Russian crisis and the subsequent col-
lapse of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) group (May – November 1998), 
the Brazil crisis (January – March 1999), and the downturn of the stock market in 
2000. The demise of LTCM may have been even the first time that hedge funds hit the 
headlines worldwide. The turmoil began when the Russian government announced the 
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devaluation of the rouble, suspended the trading of short-term Treasury bills, and im-
posed a 90-day moratorium on international debt repayments. In the aftermath of the 
announcement a crisis unsettled international financial markets.17 
 
Risk and Return over Time 
Table 5 reports each year the mean and standard deviation for the two largest invest-
ment categories, Long/Short Equities and CTA/Managed Futures, and all funds to-
gether, using discrete, monthly net-of-fee returns. The results are compared with an-
nual returns and standard deviations for the two benchmark indices MSCI Europe and 
MSCI World. A number of patterns stand out for Long/Short Equities: First, it is evi-
dent that the LTCM debacle during the fall of 1998 affected hedge fund returns much 
more than the MSCI Europe or MSCI World index. Second, to some degree hedge 
funds offer indeed an insurance against declining stock market prices and, on aggre-
gate, the funds in our sample delivered positive returns after 2000. Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that the standard deviation of all funds pooled together, and the 
Long/Short Equities in particular, is much lower after 2000. CTA/Managed Futures 
fared well in 1998 and 2000. FUNG/ HSIEH (2001) describe the risk-return pattern of 
CTAs as a long volatility position. The beta of CTAs is high in up markets and low in 
down markets. However, we do not see the big gains in up markets in our sample. In 
general, we observe considerable variation over time and, thus, any measure that com-
pares past return and risk will crucially depend on the chosen time window. 
                                                 
17  Fung/ Hsieh (2000a) study the role of hedge funds in major financial crises. Brown/ Goetzmann/ Park 
(2000) discuss specifically the Asian currency crisis. 
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Year Long/Short  Equities 
CTA/Managed 
Futures All Funds 
MSCI Europe
(Euro) 
MSCI World 
(Euro) 
 Return STD Return STD Return STD Return STD Return STD 
1994 -0.01 3.31 -0.07 4.03 0.34 3.83 -0.50 4.10 -0.29 3.45 
1995 1.92 3.25 1.92 5.60 1.73 4.12 1.33 2.07 1.29 2.67 
1996 2.89 4.45 1.91 4.95 2.36 3.59 1.87 2.62 1.36 3.80 
1997 3.23 5.80 1.64 4.36 1.86 4.65 3.05 5.45 2.51 5.89 
1998 -0.09 6.49 2.42 4.68 0.41 6.10 1.81 6.76 1.50 6.29 
1999 4.23 6.25 0.96 3.86 2.79 5.27 2.68 4.11 3.34 4.29 
2000 1.13 5.03 1.78 4.47 1.27 4.61 -0.09 3.92 -0.49 5.04 
2001 0.78 2.72 1.17 4.93 0.84 3.25 -1.24 5.38 -0.91 5.69 
2002 0.29 2.70 1.38 5.16 0.57 3.08 -2.76 6.88 -2.94 6.43 
2003 1.25 2.49 0.88 4.87 1.23 2.71 1.34 5.01 0.97 4.15 
2004 0.26  -0.59  0.11  0.56  0.59  
The table reports the average monthly net-of-fee return and standard deviation (STD) for each year from 
1994 to 2004. The two investment strategies with the largest number of funds, Long/Short Equities and 
CTA/Managed Futures, are shown separately. Standard deviations are calculated based on funds that are 
observed over the full year; hence, no standard deviation is reported for 2004 as the sample ends in Au-
gust. All numbers are in percentage per month. 
Table 5: Monthly Hedge Fund Returns and Volatilities Over Time 
 
Monthly vs. Quarterly Returns 
ASNESS/ KRAIL/ LIEW (2001) argue that for illiquid, exchange-traded securities the 
last observed price does often not reflect current market conditions; known in the lit-
erature as stale prices. Moreover, many hedge funds hold sophisticated and exotic 
over-the-country (OTC) products that are difficult to price. Most importantly, the au-
thors point out that a hedge fund manager has an incentive to deliver a low volatility 
and correlation with the market and may therefore be tempted to smooth out reported 
monthly returns. For these reasons we are likely to be confronted with non-
synchronous observations when comparing hedge fund returns with a benchmark in-
dex.  
Table 6 shows means and standard deviations using monthly and quarterly data, as 
well as the average correlation of the Long/Short Equities investment style with the 
MSCI Europe index. The previous table demonstrates that this hedge fund strategy 
behaves differently in up- and down-markets. Therefore, besides reporting the statis-
tics for the full sample we split the dataset into two subperiods; prior to 2000 and af-
ter. As we need long enough data periods to calculate correlations, we focus on the 
largest investment category only and exclude funds with less than two years of data 
over the corresponding subperiod. The comparison of the annualized monthly and 
quarterly standard deviations indicates that monthly returns may indeed suffer from 
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the impact of non-synchronous data.18 As in ASNESS/ KRAIL/ LIEW (2001) we find that 
quarterly standard deviations and correlation coefficients with the market are higher, 
independent of the subperiod. The results also illustrate the decline of the correlation 
coefficient after the year 2000. The lesson to learn from this is that not only the time 
window but also the frequency matters when assessing the risk-return tradeoff and 
correlation properties of hedge funds. 
 
Time Period 
 
Monthly 
Annualized
Returns 
Monthly 
Annualized 
STD 
Quarterly 
Annualized
STD 
Monthly Correla-
tion with MSCI 
Europe (Euro) 
Quarterly Correla-
tion with MSCI 
Europe (Euro) 
01/1994 – 09/2000 26.5 21.8 26.1 0.40 0.49 
10/2000 – 08/2004 7.7 9.7 11.6 0.21 0.24 
01/1994 – 08/2004 11.2 13.0 15.7 0.27 0.32 
The table reports mean, standard deviation (STD), and correlation with the market, measured by the 
MSCI Europe, using monthly and non-overlapping quarterly data. The full time period from January 1994 
to August 2004 covers 163 Long/Short Equities hedge funds with at least three years of data. For the two 
subperiods January 1994 to September 2000 and October 2000 to August 2004, we exclude funds with 
less than two years of data over the respective time period. Mean and standard deviation are expressed in 
percentages and annualized. 
Table 6: Monthly vs. Quarterly Returns for Category Long/Short Equities 
 
Correlations 
The finding that correlations differ substantially across subsamples deserves closer 
attention. We apply a 36-months rolling window to calculate the change of the correla-
tion coefficient over time. Thus, the correlation coefficient reported on January 1999 
is calculated using the past 36 monthly returns from February 1996 to January 1999. 
Next, the observation window is rolled forward by one month and, consequently, the 
February 1999 value is based on the period from March 1996 to February 1999. Due 
to the few available observations prior to 1996 we begin this analysis in 1999. 
Figure 4 shows the apparent drop in the correlation between the Long/Short Equities 
hedge funds and the MSCI Europe. A comparison with the overall market movements 
that are plotted in Figure 3 is illuminating. In August 1998, the Russian crisis coupled 
with the near bankruptcy of LTCM, made stock markets crash. As we have seen in 
Table 5, monthly returns of Long/Short Equities were heavily affected by this market 
event. These large parallel down movements of the market and the hedge fund strategy 
contribute positively to the correlation coefficient. In August 2001, these observations 
drop out of the three-year rolling window, which explains the sharp drop in the corre-
lation coefficient from 0.5 to a value below 0.4. The second major decrease may be 
                                                 
18  We drop the months July and August 2004 when calculating the statistics for quarterly data. 
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explained by the last bull market months of 1999 (with relatively high correlations) 
being replaced by the first months of the recovery of stock markets in 2003. After a 
stretch of two years with crumbling stock market prices, Long/Short Equities funds 
may have been still heavily invested in short positions at the end of 2002 and, on aver-
age, adapted to the resurging markets with a delay. Thus, their portfolio values would 
exhibit low correlation with the market during these months. These findings under-
score how sensitive historic correlation coefficients may be for some hedge fund 
strategies. 
 
The graph plots the change in correlation of the strategy Long/Short Equities with the MSCI Europe from 
January 1999 to August 2004. Each month, the correlation coefficients for the individual funds are calcu-
lated based on the preceding 36 monthly returns. The graph shows the evolution of the equally-weighted 
average correlation coefficient. 
Figure 4: Change in Correlation Using 36-Months Rolling Window 
 
Do Winners and Losers Repeat? 
We conclude this section with an in depth analysis of performance persistence among 
European hedge funds. In particular, we investigate whether past winners consistently 
outperform and/or losers underperform their peers within the Long/Short Equities 
investment style. Following BROWN/ GOETZMANN/ IBBOTSON (1999), we rely on two-
way winner-loser contingency tables and examine whether winners (losers) tend to be 
winners (losers) in two consecutive periods using months, quarters, or years between 
1998 and 2004. We apply a non-parametric test to distinguish whether, on average, 
superior fund performance is due to luck or manager ability. 
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Panel A: Monthly Data 
 
Panel B: Quarterly Data 
Holding Periods WW WL LW LL CPR Z-statistic 
09/1998-08/1999 55 37 34 58 2.54*** 3.07 
09/1999-08/2000 81 71 73 82 1.28 1.08 
09/2000-08/2001 121 99 97 122 1.54** 2.24 
09/2001-08/2002 175 140 141 174 1.54*** 2.70 
09/2002-08/2003 171 147 150 172 1.33* 1.82 
09/2003-08/2004 184 128 128 184 2.07*** 4.46 
Fourth Quarter 2000 22 28 23 26 0.89 -0.29 
09/1998-08/2004 828 708 691 840 1.42*** 4.85 
 
Panel C: Annual Data 
Holding Period WW WL LW LL CPR Z-statistic 
09/1998-08/1999 7 7 7 7 1.00 0.00 
09/1999-08/2000 11 11 8 14 1.75 0.91 
09/2000-08/2001 10 25 20 16 0.32** -2.27 
09/2001-08/2002 29 21 22 27 1.69 1.30 
09/2002-08/2003 46 34 33 46 1.89** 1.97 
09/2003-08/2004 49 30 27 47 2.84*** 3.12 
09/1998-08/2004 152 128 117 157 1.59*** 2.71 
A winner (loser) is defined as a fund with a higher (lower) than median return. WW (LL) denotes winners 
(losers) in two consecutive periods, WL (LW) denotes winners (losers) in the first period and losers (win-
ners) in the second period. The cross product ratio (CPR) is defined as (WW × LL) / (WL × LW). The Z-
statistic tests whether the CPR is statistically different from one. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1% / 
5% / 10% level. The results for monthly and quarterly data are aggregated over annual time periods. The 
first period 09/1998-08/1999 in Panel A, e.g., counts a total of 178 repeated winners from one month to 
the next (column WW) for the twelve monthly holding periods over this time period. 
Table 7: Winner-Loser Contingency Tables for Strategy Long/Short Equities 
 
Holding Periods WW WL LW LL CPR Z-statistic 
09/1998-08/1999 178 142 141 178 1.58*** 2.88 
09/1999-08/2000 301 212 216 294 1.93*** 5.19 
09/2000-08/2001 386 364 358 394 1.17 1.50 
09/2001-08/2002 564 404 401 561 1.95*** 7.25 
09/2002-08/2003 553 411 409 552 1.82*** 6.47 
09/2003-08/2004 488 449 451 487 1.17** 1.73 
09/1998-08/2004 2470 1982 1976 2466 1.56*** 10.34 
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Table 7, Panel A, shows the contingency table for the persistence from one month to 
the next. The contingency tables are constructed as follows: Over the formation period 
funds are classified as winners (losers) if their return is above (below) the median 
return. Then, over the subsequent holding period we count the number of winners 
(losers) that remain among the top (bottom) 50% performers or switch to losers (win-
ners). Thus, for monthly data the result for the first holding period, September 1998, is 
based on the rankings over the previous month, August 1998 (the formation period). 
To reduce the size of the table, Panel A aggregates the results for one month formation 
and holding periods over annual intervals. WW (LL) denotes winners (losers) in two 
successive periods, WL (LW) denotes winners (losers) in the first period and losers 
(winners) in the second period. The cross product ratio (CPR), defined as (WW × LL) 
/ (WL × LW) is used to test for performance persistence. The test is based on the null 
hypothesis that the performance in the two periods is unrelated. In other words, the 
probability of a repeated winner (WW) has equal probability compared to a winner 
switching to a loser (WL); and similarly for a loser. Therefore, under the null hypothe-
sis the numerator (WW × LL) and denominator (WL × LW) are equal and the CPR 
becomes one.19 
For the full data period from September 1998 to August 2004, the null hypothesis of 
no persistence can be rejected at the 1% level. Given our earlier results that monthly 
returns are likely smoothed out, either due to holding illiquid securities or “managed 
returns”, the persistence in monthly returns is no surprise.20 One important finding 
emerges when the test statistics are evaluated for each year separately. In 2000, when 
stock markets start plummeting, the persistence for Long/Short Equities fades away. 
The turnaround of the stock market was bad news for hedge funds with a levered, long 
position and these may have been exactly the funds that fared well in the previous up 
months and, hence, ranked above the median. BROWN/ GOETZMANN/ IBBOTSON 
(1999) find that over their sample period from 1989 to 1995, a period of a strong bull 
market, dedicated short sellers did poorly, and sector funds performed relatively well. 
                                                 
19  To test for statistical significance we use the Z-statistic which is defined as the logarithm of the CPR 
divided by its standard error. In large samples the standard error of the natural logarithm of the CPR is 
given by (1/WW + 1/WL + 1/LW + 1/LL)0.5. The Z-statistic is asymptotically, normally distributed 
N(0,1). 
20  Agarwal/ Naik (2000b) point out that monthly returns may produce spurious results due to their high 
volatility. 
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Author Database Methodology Time Time 
Horizon 
Result 
Agarwal/ Naik 
(2000a) 
HFR Multi-period framework. 
Parametric (regression) and 
non-parametric (contingency 
table) methods. Test by 
individual HF strategy using 
alpha and appraisal ratio. 
1982-
1998 
Quarterly/ 
semi- 
annual/ 
annual 
Maximum persistence for 
quarterly returns. Multi-period 
persistence lower than for only 
2 periods. Nearly no persis-
tence for yearly returns in 
multi-period analysis. 
Agarwal/ Naik 
(2000b) 
HFR Analysis within individual 
hedge fund strategies. Use 
alpha and appraisal ratio for 
parametric (regression) and 
non-parametric (contingency 
table) methods.21 
1995-
1998 
Quarterly Depending on the method they 
find persistence in 6 to 8 out 
of 13 performance periods. 
Losers seem to be more per-
sistent than winners.  
Bares/ Gibson/ 
Gyger (2003) 
FRM 1. Non-parametric test: Look 
at performance (winners and 
losers) for different periods 
and HF strategies. 
2. Consider top and bottom 
ranked funds separately. 
Analyze momentum/reversal 
pattern.  
3. Use Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) to test long-
term, risk-adjusted perform-
ance persistence. 
1992-
2000 
4 time 
horizons 
1. The strategies Specialist 
Credit and Relative Value are 
the “most persistent”; no 
higher risk for managers that 
perform above the median. 
2. Document short-term, but 
no long-term persistence. 
3. Directional strategies tend 
to overreact. Alphas of HF 
portfolios unstable over time. 
Brown/  
Goetzmann/ 
Ibbotson 
(1999) 
U.S. Off-
shore Funds 
Directory 
Use contingency table to test 
persistence in raw and style-
adjusted returns.  
1989-
1995 
Annual  No evidence of performance 
persistence. Size is unrelated 
to superior relative perform-
ance. 
Capocci/ 
Hübner (2004) 
HFR, 
MAR 
Ten-factor composite per-
formance model. Build 10 
equally-weighted portfolios 
based on the ranking of the 
HFs returns over the previous 
year. 
1994-
2000 
 No persistence for best and 
worst performing funds, but 
limited evidence for persis-
tence among middle decile 
funds; negative persistence 
among past losers. 
Edwards/ 
Caglayan 
(2001) 
MAR Contingency table and re-
gression analysis. 
1990-
1998 
1- and 2-
year 
horizon 
Find persistence for winners 
and losers, especially top and 
worst performers. Higher 
incentive fees lead to higher 
excess returns. 
Kosowski/ 
Naik/ Teo 
(2004) 
CISDM, 
HFR, 
MSCI, 
TASS 
Bootstrap and Bayesian 
techniques. 
1991-
2002 
 HF alphas persist. However, 
top HFs often small and 
closed. 
Malkiel/ Saha 
(2004) 
TASS Contingency table. 1996-
2003 
Annual Probability of repeated win-
ners is 50%. 
 
Table 8: Literature Overview on Performance Persistence 
                                                 
21  Alpha is defined as the difference of the return of a fund manager and the average return for all fund 
managers following the same strategy.  
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Next, we consider the results for quarterly (Table 7, Panel B) and annual data (Panel 
C). Looking at the figures for quarterly returns, we find some evidence for persistence 
at the 1% significance level. However, as the fourth quarter of 2000 shows, persis-
tence vanishes quickly when stock markets crash. Similar to BARES/ GIBSON/ GYGER 
(2003) the significance tends to decrease with longer time horizons. In contrast to 
AGARWAL/ NAIK (2000b), who analyze quarterly returns from April 1995 to Septem-
ber 1998, we do not find that losers are more persistent than winners for our particular 
hedge fund style. Overall, it appears that the ranking of Long/Short Equities funds is 
perturbed when stock markets change direction. 
Table 8 provides a summary of the major contributions to the literature on perform-
ance persistence of hedge funds. In addition to the results already mentioned above, 
EDWARDS/ CAGLAYAN (2001) find supporting evidence for persistence during the 
period 1990-1998. CAPOCCI/ HÜBNER (2004) use deciles instead of just two broad 
categories, above and below median. They document limited evidence of persistence 
for middle decile funds in their large sample of 2,894 funds from 1994-2002, but at-
tribute the realized returns of the best and worst performing funds mostly to luck. 
Typically, the top and bottom performers exhibit high volatility and, hence, are more 
likely to show up in the top or bottom decile purely due to luck – or bad luck. 
MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) observe that the frequency for repeat winners and winners 
switching to losers is basically the same over the period from 1996 to 2003 and argue 
that previous evidence in support of persistence may be driven by data biases. This is 
consistent with the earlier results of BROWN/ GOETZMANN/ IBBOTSON (1999) for off-
shore hedge funds. Recapitulating, the empirical evidence on performance persistence 
is mixed and subject to future research. Our results suggest that significant changes in 
stock markets have a major impact on the persistence of directional strategies. 
 
4.  Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures 
One way to evaluate hedge fund returns is peer-group comparison. However, compar-
ing the returns of hedge funds within the same investment style crucially depends on 
the classification system. It turns out that even for mutual funds it is difficult to group 
funds into coherent style categories and for hedge funds this task is far more complex. 
Take as an example a manager in the category Long/Short Equities. Even if the man-
ager would only be allowed to take long positions we need to differentiate between the 
type of stocks the manager invests in. Morningstar, a major provider of mutual fund 
data in the U.S., breaks down mutual funds into nine style categories along the dimen-
sions large/small and value/growth stocks. Given that hedge funds are allowed to take 
short positions with all levels of leverage introduces another dimension and renders 
peer group comparisons even more difficult. Once we take into consideration the pos-
sibility to invest in derivatives, the soaring number of exchange-traded structured 
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products, or sophisticated, tailored over-the-counter contracts, the number of possible 
investment styles becomes unmanageable. Moreover, the investor would like to com-
pare funds that operate in different style categories. 
For these reasons, investors often turn to risk-adjusted performance measures. As the 
hedge fund industry is to a large extent very young, it is common practice to adopt 
performance measures that have been proven successful in the case of mutual funds. 
We devote the rest of the chapter to a critical analysis of these measures and their ap-
plication to hedge funds.22 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio, introduced by SHARPE (1966), was originally designed to evaluate 
mutual fund managers.23 Since then, it has also become the most widespread measure 
in the hedge fund industry. It is defined as the quotient of the average excess returns 
over the risk-free rate, ( ),P fr r−  divided by the standard deviation of the fund returns, 
Pσ . 
(1)   SharpeRatio =( ) /P f Pr r σ−  
The higher the ratio, the more desirable are the returns relative to the risk of the in-
vestment. The popularity of the Sharpe measure can be explained to some extent by 
the fact that risk is measured by standard deviation. Thus, there is no need to decide on 
an appropriate benchmark and the difficulties associated with estimating the sensitiv-
ity of the fund returns relative to this benchmark can be avoided. In addition, this fa-
cilitates comparisons across different strategies. 
There are at least three caveats to keep in mind when using the Sharpe ratio. (i) It is 
common practice to infer the Sharpe ratio from past monthly returns. In this sense, it is 
backward-looking and can be deceptive for investments in assets that rely on markets 
with changing volatility. As the analysis in the previous sections has shown, the main 
ingredients for the measure change over time and the estimation of the standard devia-
tion critically depends on the choice of the past time horizon and the frequency at 
which returns are observed. (ii) The main purpose of the ratio is to rank portfolios and 
there is no straightforward interpretation of the number. GRAHAM/ HARVEY (1997) 
suggest a variant of the Sharpe ratio that has an easy interpretation. Due to the article 
                                                 
22  An alternative route is to apply return-based style analysis introduced by Sharpe (1992). This method 
attempts to identify the major exposures of a given strategy to a set of benchmarks and no longer relies 
on the self-declared investment style of a hedge fund. Among others, Fung/ Hsieh (1997a), Agarwal/ 
Naik (2000a), and Ben Dor/ Jagannathan/ Meier (2003) implement this methodology for hedge funds. 
23  As Sharpe (1994) points out, he initially suggested the term risk-to-reward ratio. The term Sharpe ratio 
was coined later. 
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published by MODIGLIANI/ MODIGLIANI (1997), this measure became generally 
known as the M2 measure (for Modigliani square). To compute the M2 measure a port-
folio consisting of a levered position in the fund and an investment at the risk-free rate 
is constructed such that its standard deviation equals the standard deviation of the 
benchmark. (iii) The denominator is defined as the standard deviation of the fund re-
turns. This is a measure of total risk and we discuss this point in further detail later in 
the text.  
 
Each month, the Sharpe ratio is calculated for all individual funds in the category Long/Short Equities 
using monthly observations over the previous 36-months period. The graph plots the average Sharpe ratio 
for this investment style and the MSCI Europe index over time during the period from January 1997 to 
August 2004. 
Figure 5: Sharpe Ratio for Long/Short Equities, 36-Months Rolling Window 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the time dependency of the Sharpe ratio. Each month, we take the 
average of the individual Sharpe ratios of all funds in the investment style Long/Short 
Equities. To account for the period before and after the launch of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, when the Euro was established as the official cur-
rency, we take the London middle rate for Ecu 3-months deposits as the risk-free rate. 
The Sharpe measure is calculated using a 36-months window and funds with fewer 
than twelve months are excluded from the calculations for any given month. We con-
trast this average Sharpe ratio with the ratio for the MSCI Europe index. The graph 
confirms an earlier finding: The strategy Long/Short Equities provides, to some de-
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gree, a hedge against the market. During the slump 2000-2002, when the measure 
declines for the MSCI Europe, the Long/Short Equities funds on average deliver posi-
tive values. Overall, the Sharpe measure is subject to large fluctuations and the length 
of the chosen time window has a major impact on the exact number. 
The third caveat we listed above is the use of total risk. Many institutional investors 
target to increase their share in alternative vehicles primarily for their low correlations 
with bond and stock markets and the corresponding diversification effects these in-
vestments promise. What matters, once we consider adding a hedge fund to an exist-
ing portfolio, is the contribution to the systematic risk (see e.g. BODIE/ KANE/ MAR-
CUS, 2004). This is the motivation for the Treynor measure (TREYNOR (1966)) that 
divides the fund’s excess returns by systematic risk instead of total risk. Unfortu-
nately, the Treynor measure is not well suited for hedge funds. Consider a market 
neutral strategy that, by definition, aims at providing zero correlation with the market. 
Hence, systematic risk in the denominator of the Treynor measure will be close to zero 
and the measure itself goes to infinity. Moreover, using the beta coefficient requires a 
properly defined benchmark and a reliable beta estimate. While these obstacles may 
not be unsurmountable for most traditional mutual funds they may explain its rare use 
in the hedge fund industry.  
However, the conceptual problems when applying the Sharpe ratio to hedge fund data 
are more fundamental. The first problem is related to the common practice of using 
monthly data and then annualizing the Sharpe ratio by multiplying with 12 . LO 
(2002) demonstrates that when monthly returns are positively, serially correlated, and 
this is likely true for many hedge funds as we have seen in the previous section, the 
annualized figures can massively overstate the true values. He provides an example of 
a mortgage-backed securities fund for which the annualized Sharpe ratio overstates the 
true value by 65%. 
Furthermore, the Sharpe ratio emanates from a mean-variance framework and if 
higher moments matter the rankings may become questionable. FUNG/ HSIEH (1997a) 
and MITCHELL/ PULVINO (2001) empirically demonstrate the option-like return pat-
terns generated by trend followers and merger arbitrage, two common hedge fund 
strategies. We illustrate this point by considering the following two managers who 
have no skill and blindly pursue predetermined strategies. Manager A holds 10% of 
his portfolio in at-the-money call options on the MSCI Europe index and the other 
90% in the index. He rebalances his portfolio at the beginning of each month when he 
buys new call contracts with one month time-to-maturity. We assume that fairly priced 
Black-Scholes option prices are available and that the volatility of the underlying in-
dex can be accurately inferred using the past three years of data. Manager B invests 
100% in the index. If one compares the Sharpe ratio for these two managers from 
January 1997 to August 2004, manager A (Sharpe ratio of 0.562) clearly outperforms 
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manager B (0.206) even though both managers stick to a predetermined strategy that 
requires no skill.24 
The histograms in Figure 6 help to understand the reasons for these differences in the 
Sharpe ratio. Whereas the 100% index portfolio has a more or less symmetric distribu-
tion the portfolio mixed with call options generates an asymmetric, heavily right-
skewed distribution. What drives our example are the few observations in the far right 
tail that increase the mean excess return by so much that even the increased standard 
deviation cannot equilibrate the mean-variance ratio. In our example, manager B 
would need to outperform the index each month by 0.56% in order to achieve the 
same Sharpe ratio as manager A. This corresponds to 6.70% p.a. and would truly re-
flect superior management talent. 
 
The graph shows the combined histogram of monthly returns for the two strategies 10% at-the-money call 
options on the MSCI Europe index and 90% in the index itself, and 100% in the MSCI Europe index. The 
horizontal axis measures the excess return over 3-months Ecu deposits; for example, 90% labels the bin 
containing all observations with an excess return between 85 and 90%. The observation period is from 
January 1997 to August 2004. 
Figure 6: Histogram for Index and Index Plus Call Portfolios 
 
                                                 
24  At most, one could argue that manager A made a successful bet on sharp up-moves of the market. 
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GOETZMANN/ INGERSOLL/ SPIEGEL/ WELCH (2002) demonstrate that managers can 
manipulate the Sharpe ratio, at least in expected terms, by employing strategies with 
non-normal distributions. The authors provide a closed-form solution as to how select 
skewness and kurtosis in order to maximize the Sharpe ratio. Their results show that 
strategies with a negative skewness and a truncated right tail perform best. This payoff 
pattern can be achieved by investing long in the market and selling short an out-of-the-
money call option, which is actually the opposite position of what works for the spe-
cific time period we consider in the above example. 
MADHAVI (2004) proposes an adjusted Sharpe ratio to account for the distortions 
caused by non-normal distributions. His method transforms the original distribution of 
the hedge fund returns in question such that it looks alike the benchmark. The disad-
vantage of all such modifications is the loss of the main appeal of the original Sharpe 
ratio; its simplicity and ease to communicate to investors. 
 
Sortino Ratio 
The Sortino ratio (SORTINO/ PRICE (1994)) has been advocated to better account for 
the asymmetry of hedge fund return distributions. It is similar to the Sharpe ratio, re-
placing the standard deviation with the downside deviation. The downside deviation in 
turn differs from the standard deviation by considering only those returns that fall 
below a minimum acceptable return (MAR).25 
(2)   ( )21Downside Deviation =
P
P
r MAR
r MAR
n <
−∑ . 
MAR is often defined as a long-term Treasury bond, short-term Treasury bill, or zero, 
but can in principle be set to any desired target level. 
Table 9 compares standard deviation and downside deviation for the ten hedge fund 
styles in our database. The next two columns contain the associated Sharpe and 
Sortino ratios. The numbers in the table are based on a Sortino ratio that takes the 3-
month risk-free rate as the MAR. A comparison with the average skewness of each 
strategy (these numbers can be found in Table 2) sheds some light on the source of the 
differences in the rankings that result when using either of the two measures. With the 
exception of Distressed Debt – this strategy excels all others with its return of 20.6% 
p.a. – and Event Driven, investment styles that exhibit a large negative skewness move 
down in the ranking when the Sortino ratio is considered, and the ones with large posi-
tive skewness move up. To further quantify the change in the rankings of the 352 indi-
                                                 
25  Note that the sum of squared deviations is divided by the number of observations (and not by n - 1) 
since we do not need to estimate the mean from past returns as is the case for the standard deviation. 
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vidual funds we calculate the Spearman rank order correlation.26 The rank order corre-
lation is very high at 0.965, which means that most of the times the order does not 
change much. 
 
 
Investment Style Standard Deviation
Downside 
Deviation
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Rank 
(Sharpe)
Sortino 
Ratio 
Rank 
(Sortino) 
No. of 
Funds 
Arbitrage 1.21 1.06 0.24 3 0.32 6 18 
CTA/Managed Fut. 4.87 4.28 0.18 7 0.25 8 57 
Distressed Debt 4.41 4.89 0.39 1 0.55 1 10 
Event Driven 1.78 1.45 0.24 3 0.45 3 10 
Fixed Income 2.58 2.66 0.34 2 0.35 5 21 
Long/ Short Equities 3.75 3.10 0.17 8 0.29 7 163 
Macro 3.49 3.45 0.15 9 0.17 9 24 
Multi-Strategy 3.51 2.96 0.21 6 0.37 4 20 
Relative Value 3.85 3.27 0.23 5 0.50 2 11 
Others 4.14 3.85 0.13 10 0.16 10 18 
All Funds 3.69 3.22 0.20  0.30  352 
The downside deviation is defined in equation (2) in the text. The Sharpe ratio measures the average 
excess return of the hedge fund over the risk-free rate divided by the standard deviation of the fund re-
turns. The Sortino ratio uses the downside deviation in the denominator with the minimum acceptable rate 
(MAR) set equal to the risk-free rate, for which we use the rate on 3-months Ecu deposits. The statistics 
are shown by investment style for all 352 funds with at least 36 observations from January 1994 to Au-
gust 2004. 
Table 9: Sharpe vs. Sortino Ratio 
 
Jensen’s Alpha and Appraisal Ratio 
Jensen’s alpha (JENSEN (1968; 1969)) is a risk-adjusted performance measure that 
represents the average return on a portfolio over and above that predicted by the Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In the CAPM only market risk, which is measured 
by the beta coefficient, is rewarded. Formally, Jensen’s alpha is defined as 
(3)   Jensen's Alpha ( ) ( )P f P M fr r r rβ= − − − , 
where Pr  is the hedge fund return, Mr  the return on the market, and fr  the risk-free 
rate. 
                                                 
26  The Spearman rank-order correlation is a non-parametric (distribution-free) rank statistic proposed by 
Spearman in 1904 as a measure of the strength of the associations between two variables. It is calcu-
lated on the ranks instead of the scores and thus more robust to extreme values than the linear correla-
tion coefficient.  
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In many situations estimating beta coefficients becomes a quite challenging task. Beta 
is inferred from a regression of the fund’s excess returns on the excess returns of the 
market.27 Often, the coefficient of determination, R2, that indicates the explanatory 
power of the regression, is low. In addition, ASNESS/ KRAIL/ LIEW (2001) and 
MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) recognize that serially correlated hedge fund returns lead to 
underestimation of beta coefficients. In the presence of serial correlation SCHOLES/ 
WILLIAMS (1977) and DIMSON (1979) propose to include lagged benchmark returns in 
the regression and then using the sum of the coefficients for the contemporaneous and 
the lagged benchmark returns. Table 10 details the differences between beta estimates 
using only the contemporaneous excess returns of the benchmark (MSCI Europe) as 
the explanatory variable, and those when three lagged terms are included. The sum 
beta for the strategy Long/Short Equities increases by 0.12 relative to the regular beta 
(from 0.23 to 0.35), an increase by 52%. For all strategies with positive betas the sum 
betas are considerably larger, and for CTA/Managed Futures the negative sensitivity 
becomes more pronounced as well. We then calculate Jensen’s alpha for both beta 
estimates. Interestingly, the values for the average Jensen alphas within each invest-
ment style are very similar. MALKIEL/ SAHA (2004) find that the average beta across 
their hedge fund universe is 0.231 and increases to 0.393 when applying sum betas. 
ASNESS/ KRAIL/ LIEW (2001) conjecture that sum betas are considerably above regular 
betas in down markets, what they interpret as circumstantial evidence that managers 
attempt to smooth returns primarily in down markets. 
Also the Jensen’s alpha is known to suffer form deficiencies. JAGANNATHAN/ 
KORAJCZYK (1986) show that a manager selling call options on a standard benchmark 
will appear to be falsely classified as a superior performer. Another critique of Jen-
sen’s alpha, which becomes especially acute for many hedge fund strategies, is that the 
measure does not take into account the scale effect if a fund takes levered positions 
and, therefore, increases the volatility of returns. The appraisal ratio (or information 
ratio) attempts to correct for this effect and divides Jensen’s alpha by the standard 
deviation of non-systematic risk, ( )Peσ . In this sense the appraisal ratio imposes a 
penalty on those funds that are subject to substantial diversifiable risk. It is apparent 
from Table 9 that especially the strategy CTA/Managed Futures gets penalized heavily 
by the appraisal ratio. 
                                                 
27  Practitioners and most services (e.g. Bloomberg, Value Line) use total returns rather than excess re-
turns. 
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Investment Style Beta Sum Beta 
Jensen’s Alpha 
Using Beta 
Jensen’s Alpha 
Using Sum Beta 
Appraisal 
Ratio 
Arbitrage 0.04 0.06 0.32 0.28 0.21 
CTA/ Managed Futures -0.16 -0.18 0.79 0.79 0.17 
Distressed Debt 0.31 0.36 1.44 1.51 0.43 
Event Driven 0.08 0.15 0.61 0.65 0.28 
Fixed Income 0.09 0.13 0.71 0.73 0.37 
Long/Short Equities 0.23 0.35 0.70 0.72 0.20 
Macro 0.11 0.12 0.51 0.50 0.15 
Multi-Strategy 0.15 0.21 0.72 0.73 0.23 
Relative Value 0.20 0.25 0.60 0.57 0.23 
Others 0.17 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.13 
All Funds 0.13 0.20 0.68 0.70 0.21 
 
Beta is inferred from the regression of individual, monthly excess fund returns on the excess returns of 
the MSCI Europe index. The sum beta adds the coefficients from a similar regression which uses the 
contemporaneous excess returns of the MSCI Europe and three lags. Jensen’s alpha is defined in equation 
(3) in the text. The appraisal ratio divides Jensen’s alpha by the standard deviation of diversifiable risk 
(we report the appraisal ratio using Jensen’s alpha based on the sum beta). The results are tabulated as 
averages by investment style for the 352 funds with at least 36 observations from January 1994 to August 
2004. 
Table 10: Jensen’s Alpha and Appraisal Ratio 
 
Measures for Market Timing 
While Jensen’s alpha captures the selection ability of a manager, HENRIKSSON/ MER-
TON (1981) propose a model to assess the timing ability. For directional hedge fund 
strategies the investor expects the manager to successfully predict the future direction 
of markets and adapt his portfolio correspondingly. The HENRIKSSON/ MERTON model 
is defined as  
(4)   0 1( ) ( )Max[0, ]P f M f M f M f Pr r r r r r r r eα β β− = + − + − − + , 
where Max[0, ]M fr r−  is the option component and Pe  the residual. Whenever the 
market is above the risk-free rate the second term becomes relevant.28 If a manager 
indeed delivers market timing ability the coefficient 1β  is positive. Similar to Jensen’s 
alpha, the intercept of this regression model can be interpreted as the manager’s selec-
tion ability. 
                                                 
28  An alternative model, suggested earlier by Treynor/ Mazuy (1966), fits the fund returns to a quadratic 
function instead of the kinked line. Here, a positive coefficient for the quadratic term indicates that the 
relation with the market returns is convex and the manager has market timing ability. 
2
0 1( ) ( )P f M f M f Pr r r r r r eα β β− = + − + − +  
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The scatter plot shows the payoffs of the two predetermined strategies from before versus the excess 
return of the MSCI Europe. Consequently, the monthly excess returns of a 100% MSCI Europe invest-
ment form a straight 45 degree line (the line appears flatter due to the larger vertical scale). The gray 
triangles indicate the observations for the strategy 10% at-the-money options on the MSCI Europe and 
90% in the index with monthly rebalancing. The black bars are the fitted values from the HENRIKSSON/ 
MERTON (1981) regression that is described by equation (4) in the text. 
Figure 7: Fitting the Henriksson/ Merton Model to Option-Like Strategies 
 
Figure 7 exemplifies the point put forward by JAGANNATHAN/ KORAJCZYK (1986): 
The predetermined strategy from above, investing at the beginning of each month 10% 
in at-the-money call options on the MSCI Europe and the remainder in the index itself, 
generates the typical payoff pattern for a call option. Running the HENRIKSSON/ MER-
TON regression then results in a negative selection coefficient α but a positive coeffi-
cient 1β  that indicates market timing. Thus, our manager A with no skill gets falsely 
classified as a superior market timer. In addition, given that hedge funds are allowed 
to take short positions, we might not only expect a flat payoff structure below an ex-
cess return of zero, but rather a V-shaped straddle.29 This example illustrates that for 
the case of hedge funds it is extremely difficult to separate selection from timing abil-
ity. 
 
                                                 
29  Applying multifactor versions of the Treynor/ Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson/ Merton (1981) model to 
hedge fund data Chen (2004) finds some evidence for selection and timing ability. 
464 Jacqueline Henn/ Iwan Meier 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
One of Winston Churchill’s most famous quotes is “democracy is the worst form of 
government except for all those others that have been tried”. The same applies to the 
Sharpe ratio that continues to be a standard risk-adjusted performance measure in the 
hedge fund industry. The goal of any performance measures is to summarize the in-
formation contained in realized hedge fund returns in one number to render communi-
cation easy and to allow investors to make comparisons across different investment 
styles. However, this abstraction will inevitably lead to a loss of information and situa-
tions where the performance measure fails. The key for the investor is to understand 
the advantages and potential failures of common performance measures. The goal of 
this chapter is to alert the reader under which circumstances commonly used risk-
adjusted performance measures may become misleading. We show the difficulties the 
investor may encounter when estimating return, risk, and correlation using historic 
data. Moreover, we illustrate the potential failures through numerous examples, pro-
vide new empirical evidence for the European market, and relate our results to the 
recent academic literature in the field.  
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